tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4660859477127700678.post2609930897067359260..comments2022-04-02T18:49:20.701-07:00Comments on caleb composes a cblog: Presuppositional ApologeticsCaleb Ohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17190426285696938832noreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4660859477127700678.post-7409065190664573322012-06-12T16:36:43.885-07:002012-06-12T16:36:43.885-07:00Perhaps you could formulate precisely how reason i...Perhaps you could formulate precisely how reason is grounded in God. How do we know about reason? Why think if God doesn't exist that logic wouldn't exist? How does God succeed in being a necessary precondition against other options of grounding reason, morality, and meaning? What sufficient conditions are there for being a necessary precondition for reason, morality, and meaning (in other words what is enough, or what conditions must be met in order for God to fully presuppose reason and so on). Answering these questions would help me not straw man you!Caleb Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17190426285696938832noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4660859477127700678.post-57659201927431367332012-06-09T10:28:01.121-07:002012-06-09T10:28:01.121-07:00Thanks for the response.
Here is my argument.
1...Thanks for the response.<br />Here is my argument. <br /> <br />1. The existence of Yahweh is a necessary precondition for reason, morality, and meaning.<br />2. Therefore, any argument (which necessarily uses reason, and assumes morality and meaning) against Yahweh necessarily presupposes him, which renders it a self-defeating argument.<br /><br />I go on to support premise 1 by arguing for the impossibility of the contrary. That is, there is no other way to support reason (among other things) than grounding it in Yahweh. This is why I spend time examining other attempts at establishing reason. I would be happy to further explore that part of the argument, since you seem to express some doubts about my claim at that point.<br /><br />One further thing to note, presuppositionalism (P) is not to be equated completely with the transcendental argument (TA). P is an approach to philosophy and apologetics which presupposes Yahweh and argues at the point of presuppositions. The TA is a key part of this approach, but P is bigger than TA.Tom Thiessenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11673043578097635796noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4660859477127700678.post-88251052198461053222012-06-07T15:43:40.858-07:002012-06-07T15:43:40.858-07:00It is at this point unclear to me how your argumen...It is at this point unclear to me how your argument actually goes, could you formulate for me? That would be quite helpful. Sometimes it appears to me you are running some sort transcendent argument (What I labeled the first argument and spent most of my time rebutting) at other points the argument is slightly different. Such as in this most recent post when you appear to be making something like this claim:<br /><br />1. Logic is either grounded in human convention or God or abstract entities (and so on)<br />2. Logic isn't grounded in human convention or abstract entities (and so on)<br />3. Therefore it follows that Logic is grounded in God, from which it will follow that God exists<br /><br />Now I have some suspicions as to whether this is what is usually called the presuppositionalist argument, but that is a minor detail. This argument will escape the main argument in the section what "we actually presuppose", but I think we are wrong in ruling out options like abstract entities, physical things, and maybe even a few more. <br /><br />Also your quite correct, I made a mistake in saying "For it's not that God entails logic, it's that God presupposes logic" I should have reversed logic and God, I will correct the post.<br /><br />When you say "If God didn't exist we could not make an argument, because there would be no order to the universe, there would be no order to our minds, there would be no universal to appeal to in order to try to persuade each other." You did indeed miss the point ;) for we can't reasonably talk about what the world would be like if there were no logic because of how we presuppose logic. Thus the epistemological issue, we can't possibly know what the world would be like without the law of logic because in order to conceive of that world we have to presuppose logic, thereby affirming it's truth. This is where the walking, feet, ground analogy breakdown, because those things are contingent (they can be the case or not be the case)but it is the case the logic is true necessarily. By questioning logic, we must presuppose logic--that was what I attempted to argue in "what we actually presuppose." It appears as though you agree with this point.<br /><br />So I think it would be best if you formulated what exactly you are arguing and we can go from there, not just the conclusion, but how you arrive at the conclusion.Caleb Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17190426285696938832noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4660859477127700678.post-43496505472396079962012-06-05T20:54:03.020-07:002012-06-05T20:54:03.020-07:00Thanks for the discussion, I think it has helped s...Thanks for the discussion, I think it has helped sharpen one another argument at least a little. <br />When I say logic would be abstract I mean they are the things which don't causally affect other things (they also aren't physical or mental). For example; numbers (if they exist) will be abstract, for they don't cause anything. <br /><br />Now there are various ways they might interact with the world, and there are various suggested ways in which we might come to know about the world. For example perhaps persons have the capability to know logical truths via metaphysical necessity. It simply could not be otherwise. There is no possible world where natural properties x will not conform to logical principles. Be that in causation, epistemology ect. One might be dissatisfied with this account because it seems to "lucky" or much to much like a brute fact. However saying that logic is grounded in God will imply similar metaphysical necessity. We might ask why there is a connection between logical properties and our natural world. The answer would eventually be that it couldn't be otherwise, because God's nature couldn't be otherwise.Caleb Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17190426285696938832noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4660859477127700678.post-66044483168218642522012-06-03T20:42:39.658-07:002012-06-03T20:42:39.658-07:00I am eager to hear if I am understanding you in my...I am eager to hear if I am understanding you in my last post, and to hear your response. In the mean time, I will keep chipping away and respond to a bit more of your post.<br /><br />I think you have misunderstood the presuppositionalist argument in the section "what we actually presuppose." (likely because I have not presented it clearly enough yet.) My point is not that logic begs the question and therefore cuts off its own legs. That is to say, I do not wish to make point 6 above. I would only make point 4 in a qualified way because I believe that logic demands question begging at the point of ultimate authority. I think it is good logic to beg the question at the bottom of your worldview, and furthermore, I think it is unavoidable. <br /><br />I agree with your conclusion that we affirm logic both in our affirmation and in our denial of it. I do not deny logic. I think logic makes a great servant, but a bad master. So let me move on to your anticipated objections.<br /><br />You ask: "how can one presupposition presuppose another?" Much in the same way that walking presupposes standing on your feet, which presupposes a ground beneath them.<br /><br />You say "For it's not that God entails logic, it's that God presupposes logic."<br /><br />I am not sure if you are summarizing me here or making an argument. It seems you are summarizing me, since you go on to say that the idea is incoherent. If you are summarizing me, I have not made myself clear in this regard because I believe that logic presupposes God, not the other way around.<br /><br />Then things get really interesting, but I may need more clarification. You say "For since the truth of logic itself is presupposed in discourse, how could it be dependent on God's existence? If God didn't exist could we couldn't say Logic wouldn't exist, because we must presuppose logic! Thus we have a problem of incoherence, and epistemology. This objection appears to damn the presuppositionalist's argument." <br /><br />I agree that the truth of logic is presupposed in discourse. If God didn't exist we could not make an argument, because there would be no order to the universe, there would be no order to our minds, there would be no universal to appeal to in order to try to persuade each other. I may have misunderstood this last point, and if so, please correct me. However, I will try to make my point further about reason.<br /><br />If reason is grassroots (made up by people), then it has no authority other than what people agree to give it. Therefore, reason is not an absolute, but a relative good. It cannot ever persuade someone who doesn't instinctually see the merits of it. It would therefore make a poor foundation for a worldview, and would not seem to conform with the way we expect reason to be normative for all people.<br /> <br />I argued in my previous post (or at least raised some challenges that I don't think can be answered) about the possibility of grounding reason in an abstract entity. We can talk more about that one.<br /><br />I also don't think other views of God present an adequate grounding for logic. I am considering the fact lately that all religions can either be categorized as some form of monism, or as Abrahamic. This helps to simplify things a bit. <br /><br />Monistic religions deny the law of contradiction by collapsing x and not x into one thing, thus rendering it an illogical system. <br /><br />That gets us down to logic presupposing the God of Abraham: Yahweh, and I am also considering some arguments about the necessity of the Triune view of God for logic, but I don't think I am ready to bust those out yet.<br /><br />I look forward to being sharpened by your response.Tom Thiessenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11673043578097635796noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4660859477127700678.post-90056840798565806772012-05-30T15:45:38.861-07:002012-05-30T15:45:38.861-07:00Sorry for the delay in responding. It is not due ...Sorry for the delay in responding. It is not due to a lack of interest or desire.<br /><br />I am not sure I have a lot of time, so let me bite off another small chunk in responding to your post. My goal will be to show the impossibility of the contrary over several posts. I am happy to hear your response or correction of my reading of you at any point.<br /><br />You say, "Logic might be founded in necessarily existing abstract entities." I find this to be a puzzling move. I find it puzzling because I don't know what you are talking about when you say "abstract entities." What are these necessarily existing abstract entities? What could they possibly be? By calling them entities, I take it you are saying they have some kind of real existence. By saying they are abstract, I take it you are saying they are not persons, but something else, perhaps something like Plato's ideals. <br /><br />If I am rightly understanding you, I am curious how these abstract entities communicate this logic to us. As non-personal, they would seemingly be incapable of communicating to us. How did their logic get into our brains? What is the connection between our use of reason, and these entities?<br /><br />Can we trust these entities? Should we? What reasons could we give for conforming ourselves to these abstract entities?Tom Thiessenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11673043578097635796noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4660859477127700678.post-21337563711857804572012-05-25T16:45:04.680-07:002012-05-25T16:45:04.680-07:00How prompt! It seems as though that what you mean ...How prompt! It seems as though that what you mean by impossibility of the contrary is synonymous with how I defined what it means to presuppose any x, namely that you assert it's truth even in it's denial (which of course is nonsense--hence the impossibility of the contrary). The analogy is helpful.Caleb Ohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17190426285696938832noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4660859477127700678.post-53042499275664183262012-05-25T16:05:53.968-07:002012-05-25T16:05:53.968-07:00Thanks for the post. I have a few comments based ...Thanks for the post. I have a few comments based on the first section, and will come back to respond more later.<br /><br />1. I would want to be sure you are understanding that the argument is that the Triune God is a necessary precondition to intelligibility. Also, that he is proven to be so by the impossibility of the contrary. It is not that people ought to believe in him to retain their reason, but that everyone actually does presuppose him. As Van Till says, you have to sit in his lap in order to slap him in the face. The only court you can bring him up before is his own, as he is the standard.<br /> <br />I am off to eat a few BLT's right now, but I will try to show the impossibility of the contrary later. Everything in its order.Tom Thiessenhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11673043578097635796noreply@blogger.com