Violence by Slavoj Žižek

Slavoj Žižek is, as the Village Voice described "a one person culture mulcher," I think this is an adequate description! Žižek can dissect a a popular movie or event and then ramble on the event by referencing Hegel, Lacan, or even Kant. I have found his talks interesting and amusing so I thought I would read one of his books. Violence served as a useful introduction to his work.

The thesis of  Žižek book is something like this: behind the contours of salient subjective violence (crime, terrorism etc.) there may  reside systemic violence, that is violence that is inherent in our basic social relations that may help sustain subjective violence (from now on I will name this thesis the violence principle). When discussing violence most people tend to naively address subjective violence while ignoring the fundamental properties of society that cause subjective violence, namely systemic violence. Žižek also ponders on misuse of the liberal notion of tolerance and on what "divine" violence is. I will address some of his examples of subjective vs systemic violence, sketch his critique of tolerance, and then try capture his image of divine violence.

Subjective Violence vs Objective Violence

Žižek offers several examples of his violence principle some of which are plausible, others are completely ridiculous. Despite the lack of convincing evidence for the violence principle as he formulates it, I think it can be still be quite useful.

One example Žižek gives is philanthropy, as a specific example he gives us Bill Gates and George Soros; I will focus on the former. Bill Gates, one of the richest men in the world is also one of the worlds largest philanthropist (an atheist as well I might add). His foundation attempts to improve the lives of indigent peoples, it addresses the subjective violence of poverty. This however, Žižek claims is a false problem. Because Bill Gates ignored the systemic violence of capitalism, in fact he thrived on it. Mr. Gates exploited workers and crushed competition through a system that demands the existence of the poor he now tries to help. In Žižek's words he "took with one hand, and gave with the other." So what Mr. Gates is doing by "helping" others is really amplifying and continuing the true injustice or true violence. Should this conclusion be taken seriously? I don't think so, it has the appearance of being picayune nonsense. As Julian Baggani asks in his review, "is it too much to ask that, if you claim that George Soros has "ruined the lives of thousands", you should provide the evidence?" Žižek simply asserts that Gates and Soros have sustained the sufferings of other people through economic exploitation. I am tempted to conclude that absence of evidence is evidence of absence. Further even if that isn't the case, one could argue that Mr. Gates crushed his affluent competition but saved the lives of impoverished others. This could be morally justified.

As another example of Žižek's violence principle, of which there are quite a few, is terrorism vs counter-terrorism. In approaching this topic Žižek quotes Brecht "What is robbing a bank compared with founding a bank?". This quote epitomizes Žižek's fondness and use of psychoanalytic reversals, in Baggini's words:

"There is the simple psychoanalytic trope of claiming that however something seems, its true nature is the precise opposite. Then you have the repeated claim that a certain position entails its opposite, but that both sides of the paradox are equally real. Then again, there is the reversal of common sense, in which whatever the received wisdom is, Žižek postulates the opposite."

Now I think this can be useful, as well as fun, but reversing ideas in this manner can run the risk of generate garbage. Back to robbing banks. Here I think the phrase should include the assumptions and be said thus: "what is the crime/immorality of robbing a bank to the crime/immorality of founding a bank." Now if someone is to argue that robbing a bank and founding a bank are morally equivalent, the burden of proof is on them to show that founding a bank is indeed immoral (or that robbing one is).  Žižek however rephrases it thus: "what is the robbery that violates the law compared to the robbery that takes place within the confines of the law." Oddly enough I think my change is preferable because it doesn't assume that founding a bank is some sort of robbery (something else which is just asserted). At any rate, In the same vein as Brecht,  Žižek asks "what committing an act of terror to a state power waging a war on terror." This example I think is more legitimate then "what is economic exploitation to philanthropy." Yet again it is not supported by much evidence. Only later does Žižek mention the Abu Ghraib scandal which about which he claims "in being submitted to humiliating tortures, the Iraqi prisoners were effectively initiated into American culture. They were given a taste of its obscene underside."

Tolerance
I have already blogged a bit on what Žižek thinks about tolerance. Here is a good quote that I missed in that post:

"The formula for revolutionary solidarity is not "let us tolerate our differences," it is not a pact of civilisations but a pact of struggles which cut across civilisations, a pact between what, in each civilisation[sic], undermines it identity from within, fights against its oppressive kernel. What unites us is the same struggle. A better formula would thus be: in spite of our differences, we can identify the basic antagonism or antagonistic struggle in which we are both caught; so lets share our intolerance, and join forces in the same struggle."

This formula ignores the subjective violence of cultural clashes and differences and instead tackles systemic violence that is inherent in a system. This application of the violence principle is, at least, more initially convincing then those previously discussed. When discussing religious tolerance Žižek is also quotable:

"Respect for others' beliefs as the highest value can mean only one of two things: either we treat the other in a patronising way and avoid hurting him in order not to ruin his illusions, or we adopt the relativist stance of multiple "regimes of truth," disqualifying as violent imposition any clear insistence on truth. What, however, about submitting Islam--together with all other religions--to a respectful, but for that reason no less ruthless, critical analysis? This, and only this, is the way to show true respect for Muslims: to treat them as serious adults responsible for their beliefs."

Divine Violence

Before attempting to answer the question what is divine violence, one must ask "what is violence?"   Žižek has labeled two types so far (well actually three but I ignored objective violence because it is essentially synonymous with systemic violence) the subjective and systemic. Subjective violence appears to disturb the basic social relations whereas systemic violence is the basic social relations which sustains the existence of subjective violence. This seems like a contradiction violence cannot be (a) the basic social relations and (b) what disturbs the basic social relations. To solve this problem Žižek dismisses subjective violence as an illusion, it is not "true violence." True violence is the fundamental causes of all things that make us worse off; systemic violence. What then would divine violence be? Divine violence would be the combatant of systemic violence, instead of reacting to the existence of subjective violence, it is active in imposing its own rules in order to combat systemic violence. It is pure radical social upheaval of the fundamental properties of a society that sustains "reactive" subjective violence. This leads Žižek to say "Sometimes, the most violent thing to do is nothing."

Final Thoughts
The things to take away from this book, are I think what follows:

• Sometimes what makes us worse off is our currently existing systemic structures.
• We must think critically about ways to end things and actions that make us worse off; there are a horde a possible factors which contribute to the existence worse off things or actions.
• Perhaps the best way to be tolerant is to share our intolerance.

Thoughts on "A Tragic Legacy" by Glenn Greenwald

Last month I read the book A Tragic Legacy by Glenn Greenwald. You can check out his, usually quite insightful, blog over at Salon. The book was a fairly interesting read, at times quite amusing. It extensively analyses Bush's Manichean rhetoric and his unpopularity. At times the reading could be a bit repetitive when dealing with these topics. But despite this I would still recommend this book as a good description and critique of Bush's paradigm and policies.

One of the most relevant issues discussed in the book was US policy toward Iran. Despite Iran's aid in deposing with the Taliban in Afghanistan, Iran was labelled as part of the "axis of evil" along with Iran and North Korea. Later in the Bush presidency we were told, and frequently reminded, that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose "a grave threat to the security of the world" (which is probably quite true for a host of reasons). Comments like these, by now presidential candidate Newt Gingrich, were and still are quite common: "This is 1935 and [Iranian president] Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is as close to Adolf Hitler as we've seen. We now know who they are--the question is who we are. Are we Baldwin or Churchill?" (As an amusing aside Greenwald documents  how overused the comparisons to Churchill and Chamberlain are by certain neoconservatives, so much so that is very hard to take them seriously). Despite the fact that at the beginning of the administration it looked as though our relationship with Iran was improving, it only got worse. Sentiments like Gingrich's, which adequately represents the neoconservative base, were entirely helpful in this regard. In fact now it's quite hostile; Iran went from helping fight the Taliban, to perhaps aiding them and as well as aiding insurgents in Iraq. How has this happened? Greenwald offers this answer:

"The president's rhetoric of threats and demonization severely exacerbates almost every Iran-related problem. By refusing to negotiate to Iran and directing unambiguous threats to it, the president (a) emboldening the very Iranian extremists whom the administration claims pose the real threat, (b) forcing the Iranians into an increasing militaristic posture, and (c) moving the U.S. ever closer to a military confrontation which--whether commenced deliberately or accidentally--could not possibly be in America's interests under any conceivable scenario."

It's by no means clear why during Bush's term we rejected Iran's offer to negotiate (though it probably has to do with Israel or US hegemonic interest in the region), but perhaps we can understand how we got ensnared by the hostile situation we are in today: by consistently refusing to negotiate and by making stupid threats. Unfortunately this legacy has continued, with Obama failing to pursue "a new way forward" with Iran despite proclamations to the contrary in his 2009 Cairo speech. Similarly in his more recent address regarding the revolutions in the Middle East, he condemned Iran for their hypocrisy:

“I find it ironic that you’ve got the Iranian regime pretending to celebrate what happened in Egypt, when in fact they have acted in direct contrast to what happened in Egypt by gunning down and beating people who were trying to express themselves peacefully in Iran.”

Iran certainly deserves to be condemned in this regard, but Obama failed to mention Saudi Arabia's similar actions and human rights abuses. It is rather strange for him to say this when America hypocritically preaches of the virtues of democracy while simultaneously supporting dictators in the middle east. Language like this probably causes activists like Gigi Ibrahim, to correctly point, out that the speech was "insignificant" and not at all different from what any other US president has said in the past. It seems quite obvious that it would be in our interest to improve relations with Iran, and not get ourselves stucked in another Iraq. It would be instrumental to not view Iran with Bush's Manichean lenses; they are not pure evil and neither are we pure good, especially as we "prepare to withdraw" from the region. Perhaps its to trite to assume that when fighting for political power in the Middle East we should exhaust all other diplomatic options before turning to military ones.

Obama has managed to continue (without all the "political" democratic outrage of course) most of the policies of the Bush legacy--of which policy toward Iran is just one example. As I was reading this book I had the nagging thought that A Tragic Legacy could be followed by A Tragic Legacy Part Two: Obama. Although there should be a much more clever title. Although the rhetoric has changed, the policies have not. The US is now undertaking wars in Yemen, Pakistan, Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, and most recently Somalia, has failed to prosecute the Bush torture regime, has launched an aggressive war against whistle blowers, and continued the Patriot Act amongst other things. All things Obama appeared to be against during his campaign. Glenn Greenwald has a worthwhile article on the "Great Generational Threat" which justifies a slew of wonderful policies which will arguably define the Bush and Obama presidencies. Towards the end of the article he says this:

"I long believed that the most patently irrational American policy -- the one that would cause future generations to look back in baffled disgust -- was the Drug War: imprisoning huge numbers of citizens for years and years for nothing more than possessing or selling banned substances to consenting adults.  But now I think it's this: that the U.S. Government is able to persuade the populace to continue to support and pay for blood-spilling and liberty-destroying policies in the name of Terrorism when nothing sustains and exacerbates the threat of Terrorism more than those very policies."

And that appears to be a tragic legacy (one that should be argued over at greater length); a legacy that is being continued to this day...

Zizek on Tolerance

Today I was messing around with ARGUNET and made the above map. I just tried to outline how I understood Slavoj Zizek's thoughts on tolerance, from his book Violence. I am quite positive that I mapped it out incorrectly, with all the arrows pointing aimlessly all over the place. Any way as you can see Zizek does not like the notion of tolerance, why? The map should explain most of it. If it doesn't then here is basically what Zizek thinks about it:

"Today's liberal tolerance towards others, the respect of otherness and openness towards it, is counterpointed by an excessive fear of harassment...My duty to be tolerant to the other effectively means that I should not get too close to him, intrude on his space. In other words, I should respect his intolerance of my over-proximity. What increasingly emerges as the central human right in late-capitalist society is the right not to be harassed which is a right to remain at a safe distance from others." (41)

(As you can see I shamelessly quote Slavoj in my map.) Is this a reasonable representation of "tolerance." Somewhat! For example it does seem as though an absurd frenzy erupts whenever someone says something that is ever so vaguely racist, and yet keep mum about more pressing issues. This  composes an atmosphere which greatest fear is the fear of harassment. By being tolerant, in this sense, one manages to leave the "other" alone, estranging them to their own sociocultural group. And when conflict erupts between different factions it is essentially because (in this framework) the factions aren't keeping to themselves. Because one faction intruded on the others space. Of course this only applies to the certain groups who don't get along (such as the West and Islam, during the cartoon riots). In order for these groups, with conflicting ideologies to get along, they must keep proper distance from each other. They must build up walls in order to tolerate one another.

In Defense of Non-Natural Non-Theistic Moral Realism

In Wielenberg's paper In Defense of Non-Natural Non-Theistic Moral Realism, Wielenberg rebuts what is usually called the moral argument for God's existence. He does this by showing that both the theist and atheists of the moral realist type, are committed to the existence of basic ethical facts.

What is a fact?
Facts are "obtaining or actual states of affairs." A states of affairs are "necessarily existing abstract entities that obtain or fail to obtain." Some facts are necessary, others are contingent. A necessary fact obtains in all metaphysically possible worlds, a contingent fact obtains in some but not all. For example the state of affairs where my dog is sitting next to me obtains contingently, the state of affairs where my dog is not identical to a number obtains necessarily. Some facts obtain because of the obtaining of other facts or state of affairs. For example the fact that my dog is sitting 3 feet in the air obtains because another state of affairs obtains, namely, that she is sitting in a chair. Whereas other state of affairs that obtain, can be called brute facts; "their obtaining is not explained by the explaining of other states of affairs." Many theists believe that the existence of God is a brute fact. God's existing cannot be explained by the obtaining of other states of affairs.

Non-Naturalism
Some facts involve ethical states of affairs. These obtain either contingently or necessarily. As Wielenberg says "that pain is intrinsically bad is not explained in terms of other state of affairs that obtain." The state of affairs that pain is intrinsically bad is a brute fact (in the same way the existence of God is a brute fact). Wielenberg calls such facts basic ethical facts. On a side note a contingent ethical fact would be as such: Imagine there exists a button that when pressed causes immense pain to a person, it is wrong to press this button, but only contingently so because there are possible worlds in which a pushing this button would not have such a bad ethical result. Wielenberg's continues to explain:

"such facts are the foundation of (the rest of) objective morality and rest on no foundation themselves. To ask of such facts, "where do they come from?" or "on what foundation do they rest?" is misguided in much the way that, according to many theists, it is misguided to ask of God, "where does he come from?" or "on what foundation does He rest?" The answer is the same in both cases: They come from nowhere, and nothing external to themselves grounds their existence; rather, they are fundamental features of the universe that ground other truths."

This then is the gist of non-natural ethical realism, their exist basic ethical facts, and these facts are brute meaning they can not be explained in reference to other facts.

How are Theists Committed to the existence of ethical facts

I will focus on the theistic ethics of Robert Adams and Wielenberg's analysis of Adams ethics as it pertains to his argument, because I think this is the most significant point of Wielenberg's paper. Adams puts forth a sophisticated divine command theory, moral laws derive from God's commands which in turn derive from God's necessarily Good nature. God's nature then "is the standard of excellence." The degree in which a persons character and actions resemble the divine nature is the degree in which this person is moral or good. Adams account then appears to describe the supervenience of the moral on the non moral. As Wielenberg explains:

"The supervenience of goodness upon the character of Marcus Aurelius. On Adams’s approach, this supervenience is grounded in the resemblance between Marcus Aurelius’s character and the necessarily existing divine nature.To keep matters simple, let us suppose that the aspect of Aurelius’s character that makes it good is mercifulness. On Adams’s account, the supervenience of goodness on Marcus Aurelius’s character is explained by the fact that the divine nature is essentially merciful. In any world in which Aurelius’s character is merciful, that character resembles the divine nature and hence is (in one respect at any rate) good."

Adams claim is then Good=God, this is modelled on a similar claim that water=H2O. Wielenberg explains in greater detail"Adams’s account is reductive in that it implies that (at least some) ethical facts and properties just are supernatural facts and properties. Facts about finite goodness just are facts about a certain sort of resemblance to God, and facts about moral obligation just are facts about God’s commands." These then are the basic ethical facts which Adams view is committed to: Good is just, merciful, and loving. Are these really basic ethical facts, aren't they grounded in the existence of God? No because Good=God! As Wielenberg enlightens us:

"In the context of Adams’s view, the claim that God serves as the foundation of the Good is no more sensible than the claim that H2O serves as the foundation of water. Indeed, once we see that, on Adams’s view the Good = God, we see that Adams’s theory entails that the Good has no external foundation, since God has no external foundation. It is not merely that Adams’s view fails to specify where the Good came from; the theory implies that the Good did not come from anywhere."

This is not to say that Adam's view is deficient, rather that non-naturalism and theistic theories of morality have the same basic structure. They both posit basic ethical facts. These facts have no further foundation other then themselves. Thus it is rather silly to claim that objective moral facts cannot obtain if God does not exist, because theistic ethics posit basic ethical facts in the same way as non-theistic non-natural moral realism does.
Ultimately the foundation of objective morality rests on nothing. Although theists may critique non-naturalist for a shopping list approach to morality (as William Lane Craig does), they do the same thing. For example Wielenberg's list includes the following ethical items:

• Pain is intrinsically bad
• Inflicting pain just for fun is morally wrong
• It is just to give people what they deserve

And a theist like Adams will include these basic ethical facts:

• There is a being that is worthy of worship
• If the Good commands you to do something, then you are morally obligated to do it
• The better the character of the commander, the more reason there is to obey his or her commands

And that is how the cookie crumbles!

You can read a more detailed summary of this paper here and the actual paper here.

Creeds to Live By

Creeds to Live By
There is an idea that Wielenberg discusses which is often brought up in discussions of naturalism & Christianity. It is that "we should try to inculcate certain beliefs about the supernatural on the grounds that widespread acceptance of those beliefs will make us better of in general." I think that this idea is clearly nonsense, but will at least summarize what wielenberg says about the matter. His response to this argument is: "Certain views in the Old Testament are very dangerous, and the less widely these views are held the better off we are." The following are "dangerous elements" in the OT:

• "There is a God who has selected a particular group of people to be his chosen people"
• "There is a God whose commands trump all other considerations"
• "There is a God who sometimes commands invasion, killing, and genocide--sometimes when there is no apparent justification other than that they have been commanded by God"
• "Some people have the authority to order such activities on God's behalf."

Wielenberg then gives examples of these activities highlighting their application in the OT, most of these have been linked accordingly. It is plausable to hold that just as these beliefs case suffering in the OT so would their widespread acceptance in the modern age. On the opposite side of tis equation naturalism is "devoid of these dangerous ideas." Given naturalism, there is no God, no one special group of people, and no one with the authority to give commands that must be obeyed because  of their intrinsic nature. Positively, naturalism can produce solidarity with fellow human beings as described in this quote by Bertrand Russell:

"United with his fellow-men by the strongest of all ties, the tie of a common doom, the free man finds that a new vision is with him always, shedding over every daily task the light of love. The life of Man is a long march through the night, surrounded by invisible forces, tortured by weariness and pain, towards a goal that few can hope to reach, and where none may tarry long. One by one, as they march, our comrades vanish from our sight, seized by the silent orders of omnipotent Death. Very brief is the time in which we can help them, in which their happiness or misery is decided. Be it ours to shed sunshine on their path, to lighten their sorrows by the balm of sympathy, to give them the pure joy of a never-tiring affection, to strengthen failing courage, to instil faith in hours of despair. Let us not weigh in grudging scales their merits and demerits, but let us think only of their need -- of the sorrows, the difficulties, perhaps the blindnesses, that make the misery of their lives; let us remember that they are fellow-sufferers in the same darkness, actors in the same tragedy with ourselves. And so, when their day is over, when their good and their evil have become eternal by the immortality of the past, be it ours to feel that, where they suffered, where they failed, no deed of ours was the cause; but wherever a spark of the divine fire kindled in their hearts, we were ready with encouragement, with sympathy, with brave words in which high courage glowed."

Although Wielenberg continues to discuss other issues, I will not summarize the rest of this book. This is because the objections which he discusses are not very interesting, and I just discovered a useful synopsis of this book which renders my project of summarizing the book completely pointless.

At any rate this concludes my discussion of the book Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe. Since Wielenberg has established that a naturalist can live a meaningful and moral life without God all that is left is for the naturalist to go out and do so!

Value and Virtue Post Series Table of Contents

Ethical Character in a Godless Universe

 

In this chapter Erik Wielenberg defends the notion of naturalistic virtues. More specifically he explains how naturalism can accommodate the Christian like virtues of humility, charity, heroism, and hope. 

Humility

A naturalist can be humble by giving proper credit to their accomplishments. This seems like the opposite of humility, but it is not. This is because in the naturalistic universe, just as in the theistic there are many matters that are out of our control. Thus when a naturalist gives proper credit to their accomplishments they must realize that their accomplishments are contingent on multiple factors environment, genetics and so on. Wielenberg says "In the naturalistic universe, each of us should recognize the tremendous accomplishment dumb luck has made to all human accomplishments, and that in the case of any such accomplishment, the majority of the credit goes to blind chance." 

From Humility to Charity

Our economic status is completely contingent on our demographic location (there are arguably other factors as well, but this one is obvious). Some of us are born in affluent countries, others are not so fortunate. Since our socioeconomic status is simply a matter of where we born, in the majority of cases it is out of our hands. Realizing this, the naturalist (and anyone else it seems) is obligated to help alleviate the sufferings of their brethren. Wielenberg gives the following metaphor: Imagine a planet where everyone parachutes down at random places on the planet. Some people are fortunate and land in a luscious forest full of food and luxury, others land in a desert where they are on the brink of starvation. Do the fortunate have an obligation to help the unfortunate. It seems as thought they do since their roles could have easily been reversed, and because the created situation is out of human control. The natural world is similar in this way, some of us are affluent others are poverty stricken due to factors out of our control. Thus humility can lead to charity.

Heroism and Hope
Wielenberg says that "the naturalists self-concept out to be as a hero, struggling to satisfy the demands of morality and secure a life of internal meaning for the individual and for loved ones in a universe which is at best utterly indifferent and at worst downright hostile to both projects... I suggest that the naturalists view themselves as engaged in  a struggle against a wild animal. The struggle is not on the battlefield where conflict rages between the forces of dark and light and where victory and salvation are assured only for the right side. Rather, the struggle is to tame an uncaring, irrational beast, and success is anything but certain; everyone has something of the beast inside and an important part of the struggle is conquering this inner monster." And where does hope fit in? Well we can be hopeful for several reasons. One which Wielenberg gives is science. Science gives us hope because it helps understand this "wild animals." Through science we can understand our biases and inner prejudices and test empirical methods which can improve peoples behavior. Further it seems plausible to suppose that history has progressed, moral standards have improved at least a little. The practice of slavery and sacrifice has been cut back significantly by human beings. Although there are problems galore and immense daily suffering, the naturalist can be hopeful for a better future.

This concludes the discussion of Wielenberg's conceptions of virtue in a godless universe. His final words are poignant: "Without God, there is no guarantee that we will be able to save ourselves from ourselves. But neither is there a guarantee that we will fail. There is room for hope. My suggestion is that we focus on the attempt."

Why Be Moral?

In this chapter Wielenberg asks the question why be moral in a naturalistic universe? He also deals with Kant’s argument on the divine guarantee of a morally perfect universe. I will only focus on the fist issue; why be moral? In this chapter Wielenberg offers two answers.

The Moral Challenge

The challenge or argument that Wielenberg is interested in responding to is as follows:

1. A person has a normative reason to be moral only if it is that person’s best interest to be moral

2. It is never in anyone’s best interest to be moral.

3. Therefore, no one ever has a normative reason to be moral.

Because Morality and Self-Interest Coincide

One way to respond to this challenge is to deny the 2^nd premise. Aristotle and Hume both do this in their own unique way. There are two ways to think about self-interest which Wielenberg gives us; a revisionist axiology and a commonsense axiology. The commonsense axiology incorporates the “commonsense” values of human pleasure and virtue. Hume accepts a commonsense axiology of sorts; he believes that “being virtuous is the best way to attain wealth, power, and pleasure.” This claim is dubious, first of all it seems that those who have the most power and wealth are not the most virtuous people. Second it is difficult to specify the type of pleasure that comes from virtuous activity. Aristotle supplies something to answer the second question. On Aristotle’s view “virtuous activity is its own reward.” He explains:

“[Many] actions of a [virtuous person] are performed in the interest of his friends and of his country, and if there be need, he will give his life for them. He will freely give his money, honors and, in short, all good things that men compete for, while he gains nobility of himself…A good man would freely give away his money if it means that his friend would get more, for (in this way) the friend’s gain is wealth, while his own is nobility, so that he assigns the greater good to himself.”

So in this paradigm one ought to be moral because doing so allows you to attain a higher good. Even a life a martyrdom, in which there is no afterlife, is a life worth living because the act of martyrdom is one of the highest goods available in the natural world.

Because You Ought To

Another way of dealing with the argument presented in the beginning is to deny the 1st premise. As Wielenberg explains; "That premise is based on the notion that the only reason there could be for performing a given action is that the action is in on's interest. But it seems to me that such claim is straightforwardly false. There are many possi ble different kinds of reason for performing a given action; that it is in one's interest is but one. another reason for performing an action is simply that it is morally obligatory for one to do so." This view may seem to short or trite, but as Wielenberg mentions it is not that different from other reasons for action; "To the question  "why be moral?" a perfectly acceptable answer is "because it is moral." This might seem odd until one notices that to the question "why do what is in one's interest" a perfectly acceptable answer is "because it is in one's interest." No further explanation is required in either case."