Analogy Argument: On "Puppies, Pigs, and People"

If puppies were treated to factory farm conditions, hopefully people would erupt with outrage. Alastair Norcross makes an argument along these lines in his paper “Puppies, Pigs, and People”. In it he outlines a scenario in which an unfortunate chocolate lover, Fred, can now no longer enjoy chocolate due to a traumatic brain injury. Luckily Fred discovers that puppy’s brains contain cocoamone, a chemical which he needs in order to experience the joy of chocolate once more. However puppies brains only excrete this chemical while under sever stress and suffering. So Fred promptly mutilates the puppies and places them in stress-inducing cages for about 26 weeks. After those 26 weeks they are slaughtered. In Norcross’s scenario, Fred is caught and goes to court. He explains that his life “would be unacceptably impoverished without chocolate.”

Clearly Fred’s justification is not convincing or at all morally satisfying. Human pleasure does not make the suffering of puppies morally acceptable. Yet as Norcross says, “No decent person would even contemplate returning puppies merely to enhance gustatory pleasure. However, billions of animals endure intense suffering every year for precisely this end. Most of the chicken, veal, beef, and pork consumed in the US comes from intensive confinement facilities, in which the animals live cramped, stress-filled lives and endure unanaesthetized mutilations.” The majority of meat eaters who support this system would be healthy, if not healthier by adopting a different diet. He continues, “If we are prepared to condemn Fred for torturing puppies merely to enhance his gustatory experiences, shouldn’t we similarly condemn the millions who purchase and consume factory raised meat?”

This then is Norcross argument modus ponens:

   1. If it’s wrong to torture puppies for gustatory pleasure, it’s wrong to support factory farming.

   2. It is wrong to torture puppies for gustatory pleasure.

   3. Therefore it’s wrong to support factory farming.

However as he notes this argument can also be treated modus tollens:
   1. If it’s wrong to torture puppies for gustatory pleasure, it’s wrong to support factory farming.
   2. It’s not wrong to support factory farming.
   3. Therefore it’s not wrong to torture puppies for gustatory pleasure.

To avoid this consequence Norcross then argues from the problem of marginal cases. This, well known argument attempts to show that animals have a moral relevant status as moral patients in a similar way that certain humans are moral patients but not moral agents. Some people believe that because animals are not rational they are not morally relevant. Since they cannot engage in moral activities therefore (?) it follows that they have no moral status. But human animals do not apply the same standards to infants or the mentally handicapped. Norcross puts the point nicely, “That animals can’t be moral agents does not seem relevant to their status as moral patients.” I think he is fundamentally correct in this, thus the modus ponens argument succeeds and eating factory farmed meat is morally wrong. Of course there are other objections against this argument, but as far as I know none are slightly convincing.

Perhaps we can make a similar argument against eating meat in general. Picture the same scenario, except imagine that the puppies are treated decently well. They live fairly good, short lives, after a period of a few years they are slaughtered for the rich cocoamone in their brains. I think this scenario would make most people feel quite uncomfortable. Thus we have the argument:

1a. If it’s wrong to raise and slaughter puppies as “free-range” and slaughter them, it is wrong to support      other “free-range” enterprises.
2a. It’s wrong to raise and slaughter puppies as “free-range.”
3a. Thus it is wrong to support other “free-range” enterprises.

I do not think that this argument is as successful as the previous one against factory farming. I think most people agree with premise 1 of the previous argument, but 1a is more controversial. The immediate retort is that people do raise and eat dogs in this manner in different parts of the world. If premise 1a is denied the discussion will either fall back on other arguments against eating meat or spark debate on whether objective moral values exist or not. For these reasons this second argument is probably only useful in an instrumental or introductory sense only. What are your intuitions about this case?

Perhaps this song is appropriate for the day, from Christian rapper Shad:



Interesting, provoking articles(though not ones where I necessarily agree with the analysis especially in regard to the last:
Hueys Over Yemen: How to Arm a Dictator 
Killing of bin Laden: What are the consequences?
Chris Hedges Speaks on Osama bin Laden’s Death

The Argument from the Deprivation of Pleasure for Vegetarianism

When most people eat animal flesh they do so in order to receive two goods; pleasure and nutrition. Pleasure is in some sense a luxury, though it should not be forfeited for without good reason. When there are overriding reasons not to engage in pleasurable activities, the pleasurable activities should be forgone. On the other hand nutrition is quite necessary; one needs a good source of nutrition to keep alive and well. Since vegetarian diet is a good source of nutrition for the majority of human animals, it is simply not necessary to kill a nonhuman animal and eat it for nutritional purposes. These considerations may seem like truisms, yet it is important to note that if meat eating is to be justified it must be in terms of the pleasures received from it. The good from killing an animal and eating it is the pleasure received from a few meals (along with the nutrition of course). Yet consider the good obtained from not killing the animal, the animal receives pleasure from the rest of meals it devours in its life and the would-be human carnivores still receive at least minimal pleasure from eating vegetarian. Killing an animal and eating it deprives that animal of pleasure unnecessarily hence it is immoral. Here is the basic argument:

1. A world with more pleasure is necessarily a better world than a world with less pleasure
2. A moral person endeavors to make the world a better place, and works even more so to not make the world a worse place
3. Animals enjoy their meals, (they have the capacity for pleasurable experiences)
4. Animals are killed unnecessarily
5. An animal will have many more meals if it is not killed; opposed to the human who will only have a few meals if it is killed and eaten
6. Thus the world where the animal is allowed to live is a more pleasurable world than the world where animals are killed and eaten unnecessarily.
7. Thus a moral person will endeavor to create that world.

Premise 3 needs to be supported. It is a reasonable to believe that animals have the capacity for pleasure, because of the neurological similarities between animals and humans, positive behavior responses, and the evolutionary role of pleasure. Both human and nonhuman animal brains contain dopamine, a chemical which rewards the brain after eating. Rewards for good behavior, behavior which will increase chances of survival is quintessential to the functioning of evolution. Given these three factors it would seem unreasonable to suppose that animals do not have pleasurable experiences.

With premise 3 supported, the argument is successful. It is quite simple, yet I believe quite convincing. Killing an animal and eating it deprives that animal of pleasure unnecessarily. Unless sustainable objections can be made against vegetarianism or this argument then one ought to be vegetarian (or vegan). I don’t envisage any objections of that sort. (In other words I will comment on objections at a later point in time)

The Argument from Unnecessary Suffering for Vegetarianism

The argument from unnecessary suffering is probably, I would think, the most common argument for vegetarianism.  It runs as follows: intensive agricultural techniques (factory farms etc.), which produce the most amount of meat, create unnecessary suffering, thus we shouldn’t eat meat. A more logical form of the argument is:

1. A world with less suffering is necessarily a better world than a world with more suffering
2. A moral person endeavors to make the world a better place, and works even more so to not make the world a worse place

3.   Immense amount of unnecessary suffering occurs to nonhuman animals because of intensive agriculture

4. A world with intensive agriculture is necessarily  a worse world, then a world without intensive agriculture
5. Thus a moral person will endeavor to create that world (i.e. abstain from eating meat produced by intensive agriculture)

I think premise (1) and (2) are quite uncontroversial. Essentially the only premise that needs to be defended is (3). In order for (3) to be shown to be true, it must be argued that animals do suffer, that animals can suffer and that their suffering is unnecessary.

So do the animals suffer due to intensive agriculture? It is quite clear that they do, in factory farms animals are subject to an intensely inhospitable environment and are treated with barbaric indifference. Mathew Scully explains in Dominion: The Power of Man, the Suffering of Animals, and the Call to Mercy that animals in factory farms are “Genetically engineered by machines, inseminated by machines, monitored, herded, electrocuted, stabbed, cleaned, cut, and packaged by machines—themselves treated as machines.” In factory farms and similar institutions livestock and foul simply don’t have enough space to move around in and will probably never breathe fresh air except on their way to the slaughterhouse. The lack of space, to in some cases even turn around, causes ‘vice’ in pigs as Peter Singer explains in Animal Liberation: “When kept in barren, overcrowded conditions pigs are prone to “vice” as hens are. Instead of feather-pecking and cannibalism, pigs take to biting each other’s tails. This leads to fighting… [So] they cut off their tails.” A similar practice occurs to hens whose beaks are cut off because of the agony caused by their confinement, which causes them to peck fellow hens and partake in cannibalism. Clearly it is unprofitable for hens to be killing each other or for pigs to be biting one another, but instead of changing the conditions they are kept in it is much more easy and profitable to cut off their beaks. This process causes, as anyone of who is half intelligent might guess, an immense amount of suffering. It will suffice to say that in intensive agriculture animals are held in disease inducing environments, mutilated, fed unhealthy diets, denied all healthy natural activities, and sometimes not even killed properly. For more information see the previously mentioned books, The Ethics of What We Eat by Peter Singer and Jim Mason, the previously linked The Immorality of Eating Meat by Mylan Engels Jr,  and this site for more info: . Obviously animals do suffer due to intensive agriculture.

But can animals suffer? I would think that it is empirically evident that they can and do; does anyone really supposes that animals cannot feel pain? At any rate if anyone did they would be indubitably mistaken. In a review specifically dealing with animal suffering, Engels lays out the evidence that animals can and do suffer:

“We witness pain behavior, not just reflex actions to noxious stimuli (protective pain), but subsequent pain-induced behavioral modification caused by bodily damage (restorative pain); we observe significant anatomical and neurophysiological similarity between humans and many animals (including all mammals and most vertebrates); endogenous serotonergic and opioid pain-control mechanisms are present in all mammals[Why would organisms incapable of feeling pain have endogenous pain-control systems?];...analgesics and anesthetics stop animals from exhibiting pain behavior, presumably because these substances prevent the pain itself in much the way they prevent pain in humans; and there is compelling experimental evidence that the capacity to feel pain enhances survival value in animals, based on the self-destructive tendencies displayed by animals that have been surgically deafferented.”

Given the weight of this evidence it seems absurd to suppose that nonhumans animals cannot suffer; plausibly as absurd as it is to suppose that humans cannot suffer.

            Yet perhaps the suffering of nonhuman animals is not unnecessary, but in fact necessary. On what grounds would one think that the suffering of nonhuman animals in factory farms is necessary? Some one may think that factory farms satisfy the demand for cheap meat. But surely this is not morally relevant , simply because it is the case that some people demand cheap meat (and in turn the suffering of animals) does not make it in any way necessary that animals be treated the way they are. Further Factory farms are not at all efficient in providing food to the general public. The animals consume extraordinary amounts of food (cattle alone consume up to 70% of US produced grain) and the protein created per an acre is inefficient; soy plants can make 5 to 15 times more protein per an acre then meat production. Thus if it is argued that the factory farming is in someway beneficial because it causes food to be more available this contention is false. This objection overlooks completely overlooks the importance of animal suffering. Further most peoples demand for meat is contingent, most people are capable of meeting their basic nutritional needs without any meat. Clearly factory farms and other intensive agricultural techniques do not occur necessarily.

            Thus it follows since animals can and do suffer and that this suffering is unnecessary premise (3) is true and without further objections (which I will discuss at a later point in time) this argument succeeds and one ought to be a vegetarian at the very least one ought to boycott factory farms and similar institutions.

On Vegetarianism, new post series

In a few future blog posts I will be arguing for moral vegetarianism, that is the claim that it is nearly always wrong to eat meat. I will look at my original argument for becoming vegetarian, discuss an improved argument for vegetarianism, respond to papers on different arguments for vegetarianism, consider objections, and argue that it is morally obligatory that Christians be vegetarians as well.


1. Argument from unnecessary suffering
2. Argument from the deprivation of pleasure
3. Argument from analogy
4. Objections to vegetarianism
5. Why Christians ought to be vegetarians

Links to sources I will be using:
Info on Factory Farming
The Immorality of Eating Meat
Jeff McMahan on Vegetarianism
Jeff McMahan on Predation and Eliminating Carnivorous Species
Norcross Argument from Analogy Against Factory Farming
comments on "Christians are what Christians Eat" by Regan

What price an Afghan life?

Insightful, ver nice article by Peter Singer:
What price an Afghan life?

New Threats to Freedom Essay Contest: In response to Greg Lukianoff on campus censorship

George Lukianoff argues that the university campus is becoming increasingly censored. This is disturbing since universities ought to be the haven of free thought. Instead of silencing those who disagree, people ought to debate. This is an important issue today, which I will address by highlighting the denial of free speech at the highest level of government, and specifically the loss of critical discourse in the Obama administration.   

In the discussion of the treatment of free speech by the administration I will discuss one specific incident. In summer 2010, Bradley Manning was arrested for leaking documents detailing the Afghanistan war. Following his arrest, Manning was subjected to psychological abuse. Amnesty International described his treatment as “unnecessarily harsh and punitive.” In addition, State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley quipped that the way Manning was being treated was “ridiculous, counterproductive and stupid." He suddenly resigned. Clearly his resignation had to do with his comments on the Manning issue. Because of the language of his resignation statement it is generally accepted that he was fired over the issue by order of the Administration. There was no debate, and there was no informative statement given on the matter. It constituted a clear abridgement of free speech.

            The Administration’s actions can be defended in multiple ways, but not without forsaking the value of free speech. It may be that Crowley genuinely resigned, but this is highly unlikely. A look Obama’s fierce persecution of whistle blowers, his unhelpful comment on the issue, and his former actions makes it extremely improbable. The statement from Crowley mentions he resigned because of “the impact of my remarks.” It is then quite evident that Crowley’s decision was influenced by someone else. Sometimes assaults on free speech are defended because the speech was factual, fallacious, or hateful. If Crowley’s comment was full of errors, then the Administration should have corrected these errors. Surely there was nothing hateful in Crowley’s words. Even if there was, it is hard to see why he need resign—instead of clarifying, apologizing, or even justifying his statement. Yet unfortunately, people resign over incidents of “hate speech” often. What Noam Chomsky said is very useful in this regard: “If we don't believe in freedom of expression for people we despise, we don't believe in it at all.” So the only option left to justify Crowley’s firing is that he and the Administration did not agree. Yet this is no reason to force someone to resign. The administration ought to be open to internal critique. Clearly the structure of a civil society, which enters into reasonable discourse, should be practiced in the government itself.

            Thus, the campus is not the only place where opinions are being censored. As citizens we ought to criticize this blatant abdication of our rights. As Voltaire said, “Think for yourselves and let others enjoy the privilege to do so, too.” It is quintessential that free speech be sustained in all areas of life; otherwise the quality of our reasonable discourse will severely fall.